Sans Foi, Ni Loi. Appearances of Conjugality and Lawless Love by Tremblay, Régine
The Peter A. Allard School of Law
Allard Research Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Publications
2015
Sans Foi, Ni Loi. Appearances of Conjugality and
Lawless Love
Régine Tremblay
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, tremblay@allard.ubc.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Allard Research Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard Research Commons.
Citation Details
Régine Tremblay, "Sans Foi, Ni Loi. Appearances of Conjugality and Lawless Love" in Anne-Sophie Hulin, Robert Leckey & Lionel
Smith, eds, Les apparences en droit civil (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 2015) 155-191.
  
Sans foi ni loi:
Appearances of Conjugality
and Lawless Love
Régine TREMBLAY*
Abstract / Résumé .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 157
Part 1. Sans foi ni loi: Appearances and Conjugality .  .  .  .  . 162
Part 2. Sans foi: Church and Mores.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 164
Part 3. Ni loi: Moments of Law .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 171
Part 4. Lawless Love: Confusions .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 181
Conclusion .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 189
155
* S.J.D. Candidate, University of Toronto, Scholar at the Paul-André Crépeau Centre
for Private and Comparative Law, Holder of a Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council Doctoral Fellowship. Thanks to Lionel Smith, Robert Leckey,
Alexandra Popovici, Bertrand Stoffel, Andrew Ruban and the participants who
attended the lecture and generously shared sensitive insights. Thanks also to
Brenda Cossman and Angela Fernandez who commented an earlier version of this
paper and to the external reviewer. Translations are by the author. Any errors
remain my own.
  
ABSTRACT
De facto unions and appearance naturally go well together.
They expose the passage from one conjugal mode to many: the
appearance as the mise au jour. De facto unions also speak to the
importance of appearing married to obtain privileges in law: sharing
the appearances of a formal union. This chapter deals with paradigm
shifts in the legal regulation of adult intimate relationships. These
shifts open the floor for questions about the relevance of regulating
adult intimate relationships today, or at the very least, about the
abiding tendency to conceive this kind of relationship as the corner-
stone of Canadian family law. The chapter is concerned with differ-
ences between de facto and de jure relationships in Quebec civil law,
from a historical perspective. It argues that the differentiated treat-
ment in the Civil Code of Québec reflects pressures exogenous to law:
from religious mores to the promotion of neoliberal values.
RÉSUMÉ
Les apparences et l’union de fait vont naturellement bien
ensemble. D’une part, l’idée d’apparaître en droit est cruciale pour ce
type de conjugalité puisqu’elle expose le passage d’une conjugalité
unique à plusieurs possibilités pour la conjugalité. D’autre part,
l’idée de paraître, c’est-à-dire de partager les caractéristiques du
mariage, est essentielle pour se voir reconnaître par le droit. Ce cha-
pitre traite des changements de paradigmes dans l’encadrement juri-
dique des relations intimes entre adultes. Ces derniers interrogent la
pertinence d’encadrer les relations intimes entre adultes. À tout le
moins, ils mettent en perspective l’idée que ce type de relations soit la
pierre angulaire du droit de la famille canadien. Le chapitre explore,
sous le couvert d’une perspective historique, les différences entre les
unions de droit et de fait en droit civil québécois. L’auteure défend
qu’hier comme aujourd’hui, la non-reconnaissance de ce type
d’unions dans le Code civil du Québec repose davantage sur des consi-
dérations exogènes au droit, dont la morale religieuse et la promotion
de valeurs néolibérales.
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This chapter deals with paradigm shifts in the legal regulation
of adult intimate relationships. It includes the shifts from a unique
conjugality to the multiplication of conjugalities, from marriage until
death do us part to multiple subsequent unions, and from mimick-
ing marriage by necessity to mimicking marriage by choice. Such
changes open the floor for questions about the relevance of regulating
adult intimate relationships today, or at the very least, about the
compulsion to conceive this kind of relationship as the cornerstone of
Canadian family law. As such, it questions shifts in latent elements of
the regulation of conjugality in law: from the fall of formalism to the
rise of functionalism, and from religious coercion to the promotion of
neoliberal values.1
De facto unions and appearance(s) naturally go well together.
They expose the passage from one conjugal mode to many: the
appearance as the mise au jour. De facto unions also speak to the
importance of appearing married to obtain privileges in law: sharing
the appearances of a formal union. In addition, outside of the Civil
Code of Québec [“Civil Code”, “Code” or “C.C.Q.”], the anchor to
regulate de facto spouses is in the appearances they offer to the
world: they appear as a formal couple. Scholars from England,2 from
English provinces of Canada and from Quebec use the ideas of both
becoming visible and looking like something, here looking like conju-
gal unions formally recognized as such by the State, when referring to
unmarried partners. The examples of this transcend languages and
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1. Neoliberalism here is used descriptively. As Janine Brodie suggests, relying on var-
ious theorists of neoliberalism, “neoliberalism has been variously understood as a
specific template or amalgam of policies, as a political ideology and political project,
and as a distinct set of discourses, practices, and expertise that together form a
rationale for governance. While the lines between these three perspectives are
sometimes blurred, the policy template approach typically focuses, both positively
and negatively, on the policies and institutions (subnational, national, and interna-
tional) that in recent decades have advanced free trade, privatization, deregulation,
and the reduction of the public sector” (notes omitted) Janine Brodie, “Globaliza-
tion, Canadian Family Policy, and the Omissions of Neoliberalism” (2009-2010) 88
N.C.L. Rev. 1559 at 1566.
2. Rebecca Probert, The Changing Legal Regulation of Cohabitation: From Fornica-
tors to Family, 1600-2010 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012)
at 52 [Probert, Changing Legal Regulation of Cohabitation].
legal traditions. Rebecca Probert wrote about “the scope of passing as
married (and having the appearance of marriage accepted as a reality
by the legal system)”.3 François Heleine on many occasions used
apparences: “[f]ace au tiers, le ménage de fait a toutes les apparences
d’une union légitime”;4 “apparence de ménage créée par les concu-
bins”;5 “les concubins ne sont pas tenus de se créer une apparence de
gens mariés”;6 “[l]a conjugaison dans le concubinage de l’apparence
de mariage et de la possession d’état de marié va justifier l’assimi-
lation de cet état marital de fait au mariage”.7 Mireille D. Castelli,8
Jean Pineau,9 Michelle Giroux10 and others have also used appa-
rences in this way.
An historical analysis of the legal regulation of de facto unions
in Canadian family law from the mid-twentieth century until now is
offered. The term ‘de facto union’ refers to people living in conjugal
relationships without taking positive steps, like marriage or other
kinds of registered partnerships, to see their unions formally recog-
nized by the State in private law. ‘Lawless love’ is a metaphor to
describe the uncertain state of the regulation of de facto unions. The
aim is to demonstrate how the so-called non-regulation of de facto
unions has been rooted in normative orders other than law: religious
morality and neo-liberal values, to which various sanctions attach.
The argument is anchored in Quebec civil law. This area is a fertile
ground since de facto cohabitants are still strangers for most of Que-
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3. Ibid.
4. Quebec, Office de révision du Code civil, Rapport concernant les droits et les
obligations qui naissent de la vie maritale hors mariage, by François Heleine
(Montreal: O.R.C.C., 1971) at 1 [Heleine, Rapport vie maritale hors mariage].
5. Ibid. at 4.
6. Ibid. at 7.
7. François Heleine, “Le concubinage, institution à la merci des politiques législa-
tives des différents départements ministériels” (1980) 40 R. du B. 624 at 631.
8. Mireille D. Castelli, “Observations sur la première partie du Rapport de l’O.R.C.C
sur la famille” (1975) 16:3 C. de D. 645 at 664: “Mais n’aurait-on pu alors arriver
au même résultat en se basant sur ‘l’apparence’ (si apparence il y avait)? Si c’est
au contraire pour faciliter la vie des concubins et leur accorder plus de crédit la
disposition est on ne peut plus critiquable, tout comme est scandaleuse et
anormale l’obligation alimentaire prévue entre époux de fait” [Castelli, “Observa-
tions”].
9. Jean Pineau, La famille: Droit applicable au lendemain de la “Loi 89” (Montreal:
Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1983) at 11: “est un mariage apparent,
supposant une vie commune qui crée des rapports que l’on ne peut pas toujours
ignorer”.
10. Michelle Giroux & Anouk Laurent, “Portrait critique de l’union de fait en droit
québécois” (1989) 20 R.G.D. 129 at 138: “Ce type d’union implique des consé-
quences juridiques dans des circonstances spécifiques et à certaines conditions
parce qu’elle présente les apparences de l’union légitime”.
bec’s private law. Indeed, in the Civil Code of Québec, de facto spouses
are not understood as spouses or something equivalent towards one
another. In this context, their relationships have almost no legal
effects (for spouses amongst themselves). Yet, outside of the Code
they are very often perceived and treated as spouses. While being
technically outlaws to civil law, de facto unions nonetheless produce
various effects in Quebec. In short, this chapter explores, on the one
hand, the appearance (becoming visible) of various conjugalities in
law, and on the other hand, how the appearances of de jure unions
(looking like), a union with major legal effects, confuse the people
living in de facto unions.
De facto unions give rise to a variety of opinions; the idea here
is to present some less explored opinions that have been asserted
through times, through the prism of pressures other than law that
influence the discipline.11 The chapter is also concerned with differ-
ences between de facto and de jure relationships. Why should the law
focus on formal differences, which exist between the two, rather than
on the nature of the relationship, which would lead to the law’s treat-
ing them in the same way? Part one provides some background on the
use of the word ‘appearance’ in the context of de facto unions, and
some explanations of the expression “sans foi ni loi”. Part two shows
that differences used to be justified for religious reasons. It traces a
portrait of the importance of the Catholic Church in intimate rela-
tionships in Quebec. Part three exposes that even though the reli-
gious order has dropped away, there are still big differences that
many people justify in a different way, namely based on arguments
founded on freedom of choice and autonomy, and a different set of eco-
nomic sanctions is now attached. But it is not clear that these argu-
ments make sense given the inherent complexity of ‘choice’. At the
very least, if these values are so important, they should apply to
everybody in equivalent factual situations. Part four suggests that
people are misled by the fact that different parts of the law approach
the question differently: for many purposes, the two kinds of relation-
ship are assimilated. A misinformed choice is not one to which large
consequences should be attached. The variable legal consequences of
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11. To be clear, it is not exhaustive; “[d]e facto union has generated a whole lot of com-
ments, defending all possible opinions, from a radical opposition to any acknowl-
edgement to the desire to see these unions sanctioned by law” (Quebec, Office de
révision du Code civil, Résumé des commentaires reçus concernant le rapport sur
la famille. Première partie, by the Comité du droit des personnes et de la famille,
Denyse Fortin and Denyse Archambault (Montreal: O.R.C.C., October 1975) at p. 2
[Office de révision du Code civil, Résumé des commentaires]).
de facto unions in Quebec are surveyed and this last part asks
whether or not this kind of union should be treated differently.
Part 1. Sans foi ni loi: Appearances and Conjugality
When advising the Civil Code Revision Office in 1966, Louis
Baudouin, an eminent jurist and professor in Quebec’s legal history,
characterized people living in de facto unions as sans foi ni loi.
Indeed, he wrote “the rise of this social problem cannot be ignored [...]
if it is good to protect honest people, it is still more necessary that the
legislature not go so far as to encourage those who are sans foi ni
loi”.12 Sans foi ni loi is a pejorative phrase referring to people without
morals or principles. It describes someone who fears neither God, nor
men and their laws. De facto spouses did not follow the morality of the
time, and incidentally did not follow the law of the time. As will be
demonstrated later, the line between law and religion was extremely
thin. Back then, various expressions were used to refer to de facto
unions, such as concubinage and consortium. Concubinage and con-
sortium both had negative connotations. The former is a derivative of
concubine from con- (‘with’) and cubare (‘to lie’). Don’t be fooled by the
appearance: cubare refers to lying in bed and not lying to others! As
for consortium, it derives from consort, which means to “associate
with (someone), typically with the disapproval of others”.13 The very
words used to describe cohabitation and de facto unions conveyed
their stigmas. Another expression that took various meanings at dif-
ferent times was ‘living in sin’ which “by the mid twentieth century
[...] was almost exclusively used to denote sharing a home unmar-
ried”.14 At the time, what we now refer to as cohabitation was out of
line with the only normative model of conjugal union. The indication
that de facto couples were transgressing legal and moral norms is
palpable in the belief that they were in sin. These former expres-
sions indicate the extent to which cohabitation was poorly perceived
amongst elites at least.
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12. Louis Baudouin, Mémoire présenté à la Commission de la Réforme du Code civil
sur les réformes à entreprendre en ce qui concerne la filiation naturelle simple, la
filiation adultérine et incestueuse (Montreal: 10 December 1966): “[c]ette montée
sociale du problème ne peut plus être ignorée [...] s’il est bon de protéger les
honnêtes gens, encore faut-il que le législateur n’aille pas jusqu’à encourager ceux
qui sont sans foi ni loi”. [Baudouin, Mémoire filiation] [emphasis added].
13. The Oxford English Dictionary, online, s.v. “consort”.
14. Probert, Changing Legal Regulation of Cohabitation, supra note 2 at 136.
Before turning to the appearance of conjugalities, a few words
on conjugality are required. It is beyond the scope of this article to
evaluate whether or not conjugality is relevant, or if it represents
a “good standard” for identifying adult intimate relationships.15
In Quebec private law, “vie commune” and “living together” are
expressions used to refer to the unclear content and specificity of
adult intimate relationships,16 or to conjugality. Conjugality as a
notion is undefined, elusive and flexible. Identifying clear limits to
the concept of conjugality would be ill-advised, especially in the con-
text of family law, since “family is increasingly defined by functions
and practices – what people do in their personal relationships –
rather than by the formal status of relationships”.17 Conjugality has
been defined as follows:
Conjugality – living together in a spousal relationship – is not
defined in exclusively sexual terms, though a sexual relationship
is almost always an important element of conjugality. Conjuga-
lity is established by a combination of the sharing of economic,
social and emotional lives. The Supreme Court of Canada has
held that the characteristics of a ‘conjugal’ relationship include
‘shared shelter, sexual and personal behavior, services, social
activities, economic support and children, as well as the societal
perception of the couple.’ A couple does not necessarily have to
satisfy all of these elements to be living in a conjugal relation-
ship.18
As such, depending on the period, conjugality can be understood
to be either a standard of being in intimate adult relationships, or a
manner of being in them. The nature of conjugality now is different
from what it was fifty years ago. In addition, “conjugality is a locus of
considerable social and political anxiety”.19 Appearances are just as
important in conjugality as they are in the context of de facto unions.
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15. On the question of conjugality, its meaning and relevance see Brenda Cossman
& Bruce Ryder, “What Is Marriage-Like Like? The Irrelevance of Conjugality”
(2001) 18:2 Can. J. Fam. L. 269 [Cossman & Ryder, “What Is Marriage-Like
Like”].
16. See Nicholas Kasirer, “What is vie commune? Qu’est-ce que living together?” in
J.E.C. Brierley et al., eds., Mélanges Paul-André Crépeau (Cowansville, QC: Yvon
Blais, 1997) at 487.
17. While referring to the sociological context, I think this quote can very easily be
applied in law. Cossman & Ryder, “What Is Marriage-Like Like”, supra note 15 at
270-271 [emphasis in original].
18. Nicholas Bala, “The History & Future of Marriage in Canada” (2005) 4:1 J.L. &
Equality 20 at 41 [Bala, “History & Future of Marriage”].
19. Heather Brook, Conjugal Rites: Marriage and Marriage-Like Relationships before
the Law (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) at 10 [Brook, Conjugal Rites].
De facto unions here are studied in the context of cohabitation.
Defining cohabitation is complex. For present purposes, it refers to
couples who did not partake in legal marriage procedures, and who
live together as if they were a married couple, usually under the same
roof.20 The existence of common children is not a decisive factor.
Cohabitation can refer to both heterosexual and non-heterosexual
couples. However, historical evidence of non-heterosexual cohabiting
couples has proven to be difficult to obtain. Further, it has generally
been difficult to evaluate the prevalence of cohabitation in the past.
This is partly because of the variety of designations of this arrange-
ment,21 and also because of the relative absence of available data
on de facto unions in Canada before 1981, the first year such data
was included in the census.22 Extensive studies on cohabitation in
England demonstrate how, while a lot of individuals assume that
cohabitation has always existed, cohabitation as we understand it
now was extremely rare before the mid-twentieth century.23 In this
background, it is not surprising that unmarried cohabitation has
been lawless in Quebec’s private law for decades. Why was unmar-
ried cohabitation lawless in Quebec for so long? The next part argues
that it is mostly a question of pressures exogenous to law. These
external pressures aimed at channelling adult intimate behaviors
were at first rooted in morality and religious sanctions.
Part 2. Sans foi: Church and Mores
Quebec’s context is specific. The ‘secularization’ of the State
only began in the second half of the twentieth century. Given the
place that religion used to occupy in daily life,24 it has played an
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20. The roof requirement is interesting as it is virtually absent from the equation in
the marriage context. While article 392 C.C.Q. contains the idea of “living
together”, scholars from Quebec unanimously recognize that sharing a house is
not a criterion. However, the formalities surrounding marriage bring tangible evi-
dence of a relationship, while the functionality of cohabitation makes it some-
times difficult to identify.
21. Probert, The Changing Legal Regulation of Cohabitation, supra note 2 at 7ff and
136. For example, ‘cohabiting’ and ‘living together’ did not necessarily mean shar-
ing a home unmarried.
22. Statistics Canada, Fifty years of families in Canada: 1961 to 2011. Families,
households and marital status (Census of Population) (Ottawa: Census in Brief,
2011) at 1.
23. Probert, Changing Legal Regulation of Cohabitation, supra note 2 at 18.
24. Katherine Arnup, “Close Personal Relationships between Adults: 100 Years
of Marriage in Canada” (Paper prepared for the Law Commission of Canada,
March 21, 2001) at 7 [Arnup, “Close Personal Relationships between Adults”].
important role in the regulation of couples. The only religious possi-
bility for conjugal life was the marriage between a man and a woman,
to the exclusion of all others. One of the purposes of marriage in this
context was reproduction; thus, sexuality which did not align with
this objective was punishable, blamable, and morally reprehensible.
The Catholic Church had a tremendous influence on the family. In
1966, according to Louis Baudouin, “the identification of religion and
of family is such that religion is often conceived as the very founda-
tion of family values”.25 Religion was stronger than formal law in
many ways: “it is mainly the Church that, in Quebec, rendered the
family the mechanism for society’s regulation and reproduction”.26
On paper, the importance of religion in legal family matters
should have been minimal after 1920. The Privy Council in Despatie
v. Tremblay made it clear: the boundary between faith and law is
impermeable, and rules of faith and conscience have no civil effect.
The facts of the case involved impediments to marriage. In 1904, two
Catholics got married. Six years later, they realized that they were
fourth degree cousins, meaning that they shared the same great-
great-grandparents. While such a marriage was possible in law, it
was against their religious faith. More precisely, the question was
whether the impediment to marriage in canon law could produce
civil effects given article 127 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada
[“C.C.L.C.”]. Article 127 C.C.L.C. read as follows:
Les autres empêchements, admis
d’après les différentes croyances
religieuses, comme résultant de la
parenté ou de l’affinité ou d’autres
causes, restent soumis aux règles
suivies jusqu’ici dans les diverses
églises et sociétés religieuses.
The other impediments recognized
according to the different religious
persuasions, as resulting from rela-
tionship or affinity or from other
causes, remain subject to the rules
hitherto followed in the different
churches and religious communi-
ties.
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25. Baudouin, Mémoire filiation, supra note 12 at 2.
26. Anita Caron, “L’institution familiale: un enjeu toujours majeur pour l’Église
québécoise” in Renée B. Dandurand, ed., Couples et parents des années quatre-
vingt (Quebec, I.Q.R.C., 1987) 137 at 138. Previously cited in Brigitte Lefebvre’s
excellent paper “L’évolution de la notion de conjoint en droit québécois” in
Pierre-Claude Lafond & Brigitte Lefebvre, eds., L’union civile: nouveaux modèles
de conjugalité et de parentalité au 21e siècle (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2003) 3
[Lefebvre, “L’évolution de la notion de conjoint en droit québécois”].
Il en est de même quant au droit
de dispenser de ces empêchements,
lequel appartiendra tel que ci-
devant, à ceux qui en ont joui par
le passé.
The right, likewise, of granting dis-
pensations from such impediments
appertains, as heretofore, to those
who have hitherto enjoyed it.
The religious authority to which the parties first turned de-
clared the marriage null. This conclusion was homologated by the
Superior Court. This decision was first overturned on appeal and the
parties were instructed to demonstrate that the marriage was null in
civil law. Following this demonstration, the Superior Court and the
Court of Appeal, more precisely the Cour de révision, confirmed the
first decision of the ecclesiastical authority: the marriage was null.
However, the Privy Council in London overturned the decision, clari-
fying the boundary between religious principles and legal rules: “The
law did not interfere in any way with the jurisdiction of any ecclesias-
tical courts of the Roman Catholic religion over the members of that
communion so far as questions of conscience were concerned. But it
gave to them no civil operation”.27 Accordingly, decisions of ecclesias-
tical courts are only binding on the conscience and the religious
impediment in Despatie v. Tremblay was not a reason for civil nullity.
While the division between legal and religious rules was clear
from a theoretical perspective following this decision, it was not from
a social or theological perspective. The fact that all courts in Quebec
reached the opposite decision may be indicative of the different
visions in Quebec and in the United Kingdom. Further, in legal schol-
arship and in case law, religious principles remained ubiquitous after
Despatie v. Tremblay.28 The idea that canon law was interrelated
with private law,29 more precisely that rules and principles from
canon law were integrated into private law, was documented in
scholarship and even bore the name civilizatio. Scholars, despite the
non-legally binding nature of Catholic mores, gave them tremendous
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27. Despatie v. Tremblay (1921), 58 D.L.R. 29 at 38, 47 B.R. 305 [Despatie v.
Tremblay] [emphasis added].
28. Ernest Caparros, “La « civilizatio » du droit canonique : une problématique du
droit québécois” (1977) 18:3 C. de D. 711 at 726-727 [Caparros, “La « civilizatio »
du droit canonique”]; Anne-Marie Bilodeau, “Quelques aspects de l’influence
religieuse sur le droit de la personne et de la famille au Québec” (1984) 15:3
R.G.D. 573 [Bilodeau, “Quelques aspects de l’influence religieuse sur le droit”];
Baudouin, Mémoire filiation, supra note 12.
29. See, for example, the two examples given by Robert Leckey, prohibited degrees of
relationship and the introduction of federal divorce legislation, in “Profane Matri-
mony” (2006) 21:2 C.J.L.S. 1.
importance. Law and religion were conflated in many ways in the
Civil Code of Lower Canada.
Marriage in Canada was one of the Church’s primary tools to
control the population’s behaviour. Historical research has explored
how “it was a sacred institution that supported the whole social fabric
and was essential to peace, order and good government in Canada”.30
The court in Hyde v. Hyde said that marriage “as understood in Chris-
tendom, may ... be defined as the voluntary union for life of one man
and one woman to the exclusion of all others”.31 This definition has
been used in law for decades. Unsurprisingly, in Quebec, “where a
single religion claimed the adherence of an entire population, the
Catholic Church emerged as the primary normative agency”.32 The
population was homogenous in terms of beliefs, faith and origins.33
Given the allegiance to the same God, the grip of the Church on the
family was easily formed and maintained.34 Inhabitants of small vil-
lages were under enormous social pressures to follow religious princi-
ples. Historical research has also shown that “[n]umerous penalties,
including ostracism by the church and community, awaited those
who strayed”.35 Religion’s grip is exemplified through the importance
of marriage and the religious nature of its rules.
Marriage under the Civil Code of Lower Canada was a religious
rite and a contract. Religious pressures were strong enough to have a
scholar write that in 1969 someone reading Quebec’s legal scholar-
ship could easily believe that de facto union – a conjugality different
than marriage and rooted in sin – did not exist at all...36 Technically,
the reign of the C.C.L.C. spanned from 1866 to 1994, but major
changes were made in family matters as of 1980. Various examples
of these changes are available, in addition to the aforementioned
Despatie v. Tremblay case concerning impediments to marriage.
Under the C.C.L.C. the age of consent to marriage was the same as in
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30. Sarah Carter, The Importance of Being Monogamous: Marriage and Nation
Building in Western Canada to 1915 (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press,
2008) at 4.
31. Hyde v. Hyde (1866), L.R. 1 P.D. 130 at 133.
32. Arnup, “Close Personal Relationships between Adults”, supra note 24 at 3 and 8,
citing Andrée Lévesque, Making and Breaking the Rules: Women in Quebec,
1919-1939 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1994) at 13.
33. Lefebvre, “L’évolution de la notion de conjoint en droit québécois”, supra note 26
at 9.
34. Ibid.
35. Arnup, “Close Personal Relationships between Adults”, supra note 24 at 3.
36. Heleine, Rapport vie maritale hors mariage, supra note 4 at 1.
canon law.37 It has now been changed and clarified in both canon law
and civil law. The Parliament of Canada has the power to legislate
about the age of consent to marriage and it has exercised it so that
canon law and the provincial legislature have been effectively modi-
fied.38 Additionally, this equation between law and religion is, for
some commentators, the very reason for the division of constitutional
powers in family matters in Canada.39 While marriage and divorce
are heads of powers of the Parliament of Canada,40 the solemnization
of marriage, as well as property and civil rights, are the exclusive
jurisdiction of provincial legislatures.41
The indissolubility of marriage that was stipulated in article
185 of the C.C.L.C., in force from 1866 to 1969, faithfully reflected the
doctrine of the Catholic Church found in Romans 7:1-3. Indeed, the
concomitance between religious and civil law is obvious under this
article:
Le mariage ne se dissout que par
la mort naturelle de l’un des con-
joints; tant qu’ils vivent l’un et l’au-
tre, il est indissoluble.
Marriage can only be dissolved by
the natural death of one of the par-
ties; while both live, it is indisso-
luble.
Many Quebec scholars underlined the similar content of the two
texts.42
Religion was ubiquitous and marriage was its power tool.
Religious actors were entrusted with the function of ‘civil’ officers.
Indeed, one of the most powerful examples of the incorporation of law
and religion was the role of the priest in Quebec. The priests were,
amongst other things, the officers of civil status. The idea of ‘civil
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status’ refers to a person’s status in the eyes of the civil law, including
whether they are alive or dead, in a recognized relationship or not. A
statut is a legal invention still dear to the civil law. Statut comes from
the latin stare, which means to stand. A statut is a “body of rules gov-
erning the juridical condition of a person”.43 In fact, it creates a juridi-
cal condition for a person or a category of persons. This juridical
condition entails rights, duties, obligations or privileges only to those
benefiting from the said statut. From 1866 to 1968, articles 42, 44,
128 and 129 of the C.C.L.C., while modified a few times, were written
so that almost only priests could keep registers of the marriages that
were celebrated in the province and, incidentally, grant statuts. This
specificity of Quebec’s law is striking when compared with France,
and cannot be explained by Quebec’s distinct legal tradition within
Canada. In France, civil status was secularized just after the French
Revolution. As such, as of 1792, the registers of civil status were the
responsibility of designated civil officers.44 The situation was far dif-
ferent in Quebec. Priests were responsible for the solemnization of
every ritual of life (and law), for maintaining demographic statistics
and for the registers of civil status.45 This means that the only way to
modify your civil status was to abide by the principles of the Church.
Having a civil status meant being baptized in the Church, being mar-
ried in the Church, and so on. From a common law perspective, it was
as if the priest, amongst his other roles, was the Registrar General.
The priest was even a matrimonial counsellor and offered mandatory
wedding preparation services in Quebec. This situation prevailed
until 1968, the year in which civil marriage became possible. There-
fore, before 1960,
the only conjugality possible in Quebec private law, occurs around
the religious marriage, the only institution having social and
legal recognition. The law is intimately tied to the diktats of the
religious powers. The Church is thus the only space where mar-
riages are celebrated. [...] which preserves the power of the
Church.46
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Stigmas were related to the fact that de facto spouses were
living outside of the morality of the time, outside of the religious
principles that were ubiquitous in private law. They were discrimi-
nated against. For example, in terms of wills and estates (called suc-
cessions in Quebec law) a de facto spouse could not inherit ab intestat.
Further, the children of de facto spouses were not heirs either. Mem-
bers of such conjugal arrangements were not only strangers to one
another in law, they were even prevented from performing certain
juridical acts. It was impossible for them to make gifts to one
another.47 In addition, they were labelled pejoratively, in the Code
and in life, as illegitimate unions, illegitimate spouses or illegitimate
children.48 An important sanction was the standing of the children
resulting from de facto unions. The conception of the child at law has
shifted in time. At a time where the child was conceived as the prop-
erty of the head of the household, the fact that his non-marital chil-
dren were of lesser status than children from marriages was a direct
sanction.49 To emphasize that only marriage was a good option for
conjugality, law ignored or punished de facto spouses and their off-
spring.
To a certain extent, religious mores were connected to the public
regulation of sexual behaviours. “[O]ne could think that it was an
unacknowledged question of morality which prevented the legislator
from recognizing de facto spouses in law. It was also a method of legit-
imizing only one form of union – that of marriage”.50 The only possi-
bility for sexuality was sex in the married bed in the missionary
position;51 anything different was either a felony or a blameable act.
Legal scholars of the time were well aware of this vicious interaction
between law and religion. A law professor, cited in a report to the
Civil Code Revision Office, wrote in 1957:
It is indeed superfluous to describe here the extent to which
Christianity confines sexual relations to the institution of mar-
riage. Since for all practical purposes, it would not be possible for
another morality to exist other than Christian morality, there
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would be a conflict between religion and the law as soon as the
latter accepted to admit unions outside of marriage.52
De facto spouses were living – whether it was a choice or a neces-
sity was irrelevant – a life contrary to public order, contrary to public
religious order.53
Quebec’s Quiet Revolution in the sixties – the principal aim of
which was the secularization of society – led to the transformation of
the family, both in terms of its content and in terms of its regulation.
The State started replacing the Church in family lives, but most
importantly in family law. The fall of the importance of the Church
affected its power over the family, and reforms were initiated. This
important decrease of the Church’s influence allowed for the appear-
ance of various forms of conjugalities. It led to a drop in marriage
rates, and more generally, to the decline of conjugality as the founda-
tional tie of family regulation. The next part traces the key legislative
points in the evolution of the regulation of de facto unions in Quebec
law. The reception of the changes that were made has not been
smooth and critics were vehement. The appearance of de facto unions
in the public sphere and in an impressive number of social laws
(insurance, pensions, taxation, labour, education, procedure, election
law, and more) has not had the effect of making them part of ‘The
Family’54 in the Civil Code. The next part studies the evolution of the
regulation of de facto unions at law.
Part 3. Ni loi: Moments of Law
This part is about the changes concerning de facto unions that
were made in Canadian private law, mostly in Quebec private law,
after the Quiet Revolution. In this context, appearance refers to the
idea that people living outside of the marriage paradigm became visi-
ble and that the possibilities for conjugality multiplied: conjugalities.
The counterpart of this statement, however, is paradoxical. Indeed, it
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seems that while the possibilities for adult intimate relationships
have multiplied, their acknowledgement by the law depends on their
similarity with the law’s conception of marriage, in some case one
could even say “good” marriage. The primary focus in this part is to
expose the apparition of various conjugalities, through the legislative
changes that were made to include de facto unions as a legitimate
alternative to marriage. The evolution is not necessarily chronologi-
cal, since changes are divided as to their nature, i.e. inside or outside
the Civil Code.
In Quebec, the first legislative recognition of de facto unions out-
side the Code dates back to 1965. The Act Respecting the Québec Pen-
sion Plan was modified then so that an unmarried widow, who had
been living with her spouse for at least seven years, could have a right
to a pension.55 In the wake of this, many social laws were modified to
include de facto unions. In 1968, the introduction of civil marriage
through Bill 77 represented the beginning of major changes in Que-
bec private law.56 While it did not concern de facto unions, Bill 77
allowed couples without – or with a different – religious affiliation to
register their unions and to have the same rights and duties as reli-
giously married couples. Even though this amendment was conserva-
tive, inasmuch as it was not about recognizing de facto unions, in
expanding the reach of marriage it nonetheless allowed for a new
possibility of conjugality. Marriage was still a prerequisite for
formally-recognized intimate adult relationships, but it could exist
outside of Christendom. From that point on, marriage could be cele-
brated by someone other than a priest. This ‘civilization’ of marriage
represented a first disassociation between religion and the family,
even if de facto unions were still excluded from the legal sphere.
The federal Divorce Act of 1968 was the first divorce law in the
province of Quebec and is also a change outside of the Civil Code.57
Before that, one needed to make a request for Parliament to grant a
divorce by way of a private member’s bill. The facilitation of divorce
represented a new step towards the secularization of the family.
Indeed, “the division that we think exists [...] becomes blurred with
the popularization of divorce and its penetration into societal atti-
tudes”.58 As explained earlier, the religious conception of Catholic
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marriage was – and still is – clear: marriage is indissoluble, only the
death of one spouse may end it. The increasing availability of divorce
triggered a process towards the desacralization of adult intimate
relationships. Not only was it now possible to be civilly married, but
the State also made it possible to have multiple subsequent mar-
riages, notwithstanding religious precepts. By the end of the sixties,
the indissoluble and religious features of marriage were considered
to no longer belong in the legal sphere. Yet, scholars remained deeply
attached to religious values. This is particularly striking when it
comes to changes in the, usually, sacrosanct Civil Code.
When it comes to changes inside the Civil Code, 1955 is a key
date. In 1955, the Legislature of the Province of Quebec decided that
the Civil Code of Lower Canada needed to be revised.59 The Legisla-
ture gave the mandate to the Civil Code Revision Office (“C.C.R.O.”)
to draft a new Civil Code that would “reflect the social, moral and eco-
nomic realities of today’s Quebec; it had to be a body of law that was
alive and contemporary, and which would be responsive to the con-
cerns, attentive to the needs and in harmony with the requirements
of a changing society in search of a new equilibrium”.60 The work
started in the 1960s and lasted for decades. It ultimately led to the
coming into force of the Civil Code of Québec in 1994. The C.C.R.O.
proposed highly contentious suggestions for the regulation of de facto
unions inside of the Code.
The Committee on the Law of Persons and Family Law – piloted
by the Honourable Claire L’Heureux-Dubé – made important sugges-
tions about de facto unions to the C.C.R.O. To begin, the Committee
suggested including de facto unions in the new Code. This first propo-
sition was to include a definition of ‘de facto consorts’ in the Code. The
definition read as follows:
Définition d’époux de fait De facto consorts: definition
Article 102: Article 102:
Sont des époux de fait deux person-
nes de sexe différent qui, sans être
mariées l’une avec l’autre vivent
Any two persons of opposite sex,
not married to each other, who
live together openly as husband
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ensemble ouvertement comme mari
et femme, d’une façon continue et
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and wife in a continuous and stable
manner, are de facto consorts.
In addition to formally including de facto unions in the Civil
Code, the Committee proposed four important changes in the regula-
tion of this factual situation. First, it suggested that, in adult inti-
mate relationships, interdependency be not associated with a legal
status (i.e. being married), but rather be recognized by the nature
of the relationship of partners (i.e. whether they lived together). As
such, when adults elect to form a ‘stable’ and ‘continuous’ union, they
should, when possible, have a duty to support each other. The Com-
mittee was thus advocating in favour of a functional understanding
of adult intimate relationships. Its other propositions were to apply
the presumption of paternity to de facto male spouses, to extend
heirship to de facto spouses, and to oblige them to contribute towards
the expenses of the household in proportion to their respective
means. While most of these suggestions were ultimately made by the
C.C.R.O. in its final report to the legislature, the legislature decided
that they should not be part of the new Civil Code.
The reactions of respected scholars of the time betray the nega-
tive opinion of some jurists on the matter. For example, Mireille
Castelli wrote in 1975:
We will not start impugning motives or morality [of de facto
spouses]. But what we find to be profoundly abnormal and
immoral is that after having rejected marriage, they expect to
benefit from certain advantages (in other words, advantages
without the disadvantages). It is good that people take responsi-
bility for their decisions, and that we do not always soften the con-
sequences of their decisions.61
Later in the same article, she added that “de facto spouses seem
quite wrong to complain. It was at the moment they decided not to get
married that they should have weighed the consequences of their
actions”.62 While clearly opposed to the proposed modifications, she
commented quite neutrally in comparison to others.
For Ernest Caparros, professor of law at Université Laval, “the
worst enemies of the family are exaggerated individualism and
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exaggerated socialism”.63 To him, all the evils of family law could
be summed up in three words: divorce, abortion and... concubinage.
His remarks on the propositions of the C.C.R.O. were scathing:
The report proposes a juridical recognition of what it calls – in a
discreet euphemism – the de facto union.
The fact that concubinage is more common or more public does
not authorize the legislator to legitimize it.
One must take into account the realities, but only so far as they
deserve.
[P]ainful situations can arise between de facto spouses if the leg-
islator does not intervene! Indeed, but these will be the responsi-
bility of the concubines themselves.
These [...] examples [...] can suffice to stress that the Committee
does not always seek the well-being of the family of the future. It
proposes, also, incidentally, provisions which can become tools of
the self-destruction of the family.
The Association des parents catholiques du Québec (“Associ-
ation”) was also shocked. In its opinion, the propositions of the
C.C.R.O. relied on new values, “born, in large part, from the rejection
of all morality, traditions, and of all authority”.64 According to the
Association, the values promoted by the Committee on the Law of
Persons and Family Law were reflecting, among other vices, egoism,
individualism, raging materialism, unstoppable liberalism, disre-
spect of basic human rights and agnosticism.65 The Committee was
trying to “make certain marginalized, devastating and loose situa-
tions be accepted as natural, legitimate and valuable”.66 The attitude
of the Committee towards family values would lead to anarchy and
dehumanisation. It regretted the propositions and interpreted them
as threatening the stability, the autonomy and the privacy of the fam-
ily.67 The Association believed that people thinking and promoting
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such values and ideas, let alone people living in this situation, were
deviant.
Some critics were not relying on moral imperatives.68 The dis-
course of choice and autonomy/freedom was and still is central in the
debate. The Conseil du statut de la femme (“C.S.F.”), which now
defends the opposite position,69 suggested in November 1975 that
choice and autonomy in adult intimate relationship should be valued
and that the State should not intervene.70 The C.S.F. still saw in the
propositions of the C.C.R.O., and in the possible intervention of the
State resulting of these propositions, an idea that a de facto union
was a ‘culpable’ union and that it was still posited as against good
morals.71 The C.S.F. noted that some propositions were written as to
still disadvantage de facto over de jure unions.72 It was nonetheless in
favor of extending certain elements to de facto spouses (for example,
the presumption of paternity that still only applies to de jure unions
in 2014). Later, in the Mémoire présenté à la Commission parlemen-
taire sur la réforme du droit de la famille, the C.S.F. recommended,
amongst other things, to respect the choice of persons who decided
not to marry.73 These opinions have been given in a specific context
for women and feminism that is beyond the purpose of this paper and
should be contextualized.
Commentators were not all opposed to regulating de facto
unions. The Organismes familiaux associés du Québec welcomed the
propositions and suggested a minimal three-year period for a rela-
tionship to be recognized as a de facto union and a minimum age
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requirement of 21 years.74 In an opinion published in Le Devoir,
Paul Carbonneau, a notary, was also optimistic about the proposed
changes. He wrote “it seems to me today more praiseworthy to try to
remedy some of the problems arising from a de facto union, and from
its consequences on the family, than to refuse to consider it because
the de facto spouses and their children are not a family in the tradi-
tional sense”.75 In the end, de facto unions were not integrated in the
Civil Code.
Despite the strong resistance to change when de facto unions
were concerned, as time passed, changes kept taking place. Some of
the changes affected only marriage, but somehow allowed de facto
unions to evolve. Some key modifications to the Civil Code of Lower
Canada directly improved the legal status of de facto spouses. For
example, under article 768 C.C.L.C., “[g]ifts inter vivos made in favor
of the person with whom the donor has lived in concubinage, or of the
incestuous or adulterine children of such a donor, are limited to main-
tenance”. This prohibition was abrogated in 1981. “In the eyes of com-
mentators, the disappearance of these provisions marked the end of
an era and the beginning of another. In eliminating the last limit in
the Code to the contractual freedom of de facto spouses, the legisla-
ture gave them the benefit of appealing to the law to regulate their
relationship”.76 Further, “[i]t was a turning point for the progressive
recognition by the law, that individuals can, through contract, regu-
late some dimension of their conjugality in private law”.77 Other
examples concerned the lease. As of 1979, the “concubinary of the les-
see, if he had been living with the lessee for at least six months, has in
regard of the lessor the rights and obligations resulting from the lease
if he continues to occupy the dwelling and gives the lessor a notice to
that effect within two months after the cessation of cohabitation”.78
Other modifications were also made about retaking possession of a
dwelling.79
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Further modifications indirectly enhanced the situation of
de facto consorts. Family law in Quebec went through an important
reform in the eighties. As of 1980, distinctions between natural and
legitimate children almost completely vanished from the Code.80 One
of the strongest ways to punish concubines was to deny legal recogni-
tion to their children. Following 1980, changes in the regulation of
de facto unions in public law, private law and case law started bur-
geoning. In 1993, de facto spouses began to be considered as a unit for
taxation purposes, both at the provincial and federal levels.81 After-
wards, the Supreme Court of Canada made two important decisions
about adult intimate relationships that impacted the jurist’s imagi-
nation about the nature of conjugality in both common law and civil
law, and ultimately opened the door to increasing rights and privi-
leges for de facto spouses. In 1995, the Court decided that marital sta-
tus was an analogous ground for discrimination for the purpose of
section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms82 and
acknowledged the same for sexual orientation,83 thus confirming
that discriminating between married and unmarried spouses was not
constitutionally possible notwithstanding the sexual orientation of
the spouses. In Miron and Egan, the issue were towards third parties.
A few years later, in M. v. H.,84 the definition of ‘spouse’ for support
purposes in Ontario was broadened and the Supreme Court decided
that ‘spouse’ included same-sex spouses. However, this time the
statute was not concerned with third parties, but with the obligations
spouses owed to one another. These changes in the definition of a
spouse in law incidentally transformed the understanding of the
characterization of a ‘good’ spouse or of a ‘legitimate’ union.
In this wind of change, important modifications were made by
the Quebec legislature, but one must bear in mind that in the Civil
Code of Québec, the symbol of Quebec’s private law, de facto unions is
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not creative of a particular legal status and spouses, for the most part,
are still today almost strangers towards one another. These modifica-
tions allowed for the appearance of conjugalities, for the multiplica-
tion of patterns for adult intimate relationships. As a consequence,
not only did they de-stigmatize de facto unions, but they also dis-
lodged marriage from its role as the only possibility for valid conju-
gality. In 1999, An Act to amend various legislative provisions concer-
ning de facto spouses85 came into force. The legislature stated the
bill’s purpose as follows: “this bill amends the Acts and regulations
that contain a definition of the concept of de facto spouse to allow de
facto unions to be recognized without regard to the sex of the persons
concerned”.86 As such, the bill allowed for the inclusion of de facto
spouses and same-sex de facto spouses. Shortly after came Bill 84, An
Act instituting civil unions and establishing new rules of filiation.87
The purpose of this bill was to create “an institution, the civil union,
for couples of the opposite or the same sex who wish to make a public
commitment to live together as a couple and to uphold the rights and
obligations stemming from such status”.88 Following these important
legislative measures and the significant transformation of the nature
of adult intimate relationships, the legislature decided to specify the
meaning of spouse via section 61.189 of the Interpretation Act:90
The word “spouse” means a married or civil union spouse.
The word “spouse” includes a de facto spouse unless the context
indicates otherwise. Two persons of opposite sex or the same sex
who live together and represent themselves publicly as a couple
are de facto spouses regardless, except where otherwise pro-
vided, of how long they have been living together. If, in the
absence of a legal criterion for the recognition of a de facto union,
a controversy arises as to whether persons are living together,
that fact is presumed when they have been cohabiting for at least
one year or from the time they together become the parents of a
child.
In a short time, Canadian private law had witnessed the ap-
pearance and proliferation of conjugalities. In Quebec, the introduc-
tion of the civil union put the final nail in the coffin of marriage’s
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monopoly.91 It also significantly reduced the grip of religious princi-
ples as legal norms for dictating the possibility of adult intimate rela-
tionships. Indeed, when same-sex unions became legally possible, the
“conflict between religion and law” described in 1957 by Professor
Duval92 had already been taking place – and religion had mostly lost
to law. In 2005, the federal Civil Marriage Act defined marriage “for
civil purposes, [a]s the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of
all others”.93 This new definition confirmed the disassociation of the
spheres of influence of religion and law when it comes to adult inti-
mate relationships. Of course, religious principles are still prevalent
in a vast majority of marriages, but marriage produces civil effects
that are independent of religious principles.
Marriage has been dislodged from its unique and superior sta-
tus.94 The ideological divide between de jure unions and de facto
unions has been attenuated. Indeed, when it becomes possible for
marriage bonds to dissolve, for marriage to be completely secular,
when stigmas surrounding sexuality outside marriage and same-sex
unions are abolished and can produce civil effects, the institution of
marriage is renewed and marriage’s content has changed. Its fea-
tures started to be akin to other forms of union and the characteris-
tics of marriages and de facto unions – transforming institutions –
started converging. Benoît Moore highlights that if “the de facto
union remains heterogeneous, it remains so less and less, a large
number of de facto unions representing a strong functional similarity
with marriage. Inversely, marriage also converges with the de facto
union, especially since it is less homogeneous and stable than
before”.95 Another factor that contributed to the fading away of the
principal criticisms of de facto unions was the increasing instability
of marriage occasioned by easier access to divorce. While both institu-
tions started at the complete opposite ends of the spectrum, it seems
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that they have met somewhere along the way with the passage of
time.
Although marriage and de facto relationships have converged in
life, there are still important differences in law, especially in the Civil
Code of Québec. With the legal and social changes surrounding the
family, new sets of values and mores have been put forward. As was
the case with religious mores, some argue that these values deserve
absolute protection. In a neo-liberalist fashion, the Code encourages
people – only some kind of people in family law, i.e. de facto spouses –
“to see themselves as individualized and active subjects responsible
for enhancing their own well-being”.96 The Code is channelling adult
intimate behaviors. It was first rooted in morality and religious sanc-
tions and now it is in an under-problematized “choice argument”. In
light of these questions, the next part problematizes the notion of
choice and puts in perspective this idea that ‘choice’ is central to the
issue of regulating conjugality.
Part 4.  Lawless Love: Confusions
From religious pressure to a problematic ‘freedom of choice’
argument anchored in a neoliberal ideology, de facto conjugality has
been a “locus of political anxiety”97 for decades in Quebec. It is impor-
tant to pay careful attention to the context before ranking choice and
autonomy as superior values in the discourse, and before picturing de
facto spouses as, as mentioned earlier, “active agents responsible for
their own well-being”.98 Although the religious normative order has
receded, differences that continue to exist between de jure and de
facto spouses are arguably founded on a neoliberal ideology, relying
on freedom of choice, individuality, minimal government, autonomy,
and more, and enforced by economic penalties instead of social or reli-
gious ones. The impact of this ideology is often underestimated.
Insufficient consideration has been paid to the fact that it seems to
apply only to certain kinds of conjugality.
Differences and similarities of treatment between de jure and de
facto unions are criticized at different levels. Differences of treatment
are unjustifiable since the nature and functions of the relationships
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are largely the same. Yet, in the current state of things, similarities
need to be problematized as well because they create confusion. The
similarities are misleading people in their so-called choice. Differ-
ences are undesirable and have an active role, while similarities,
even if desirable, have a passive role. Yet, they both expose how
‘choice’ sometimes does not mean much.
The absence of legal regulation or the differentiated treatment,
for the most part, is in the Civil Code. The Civil Code stands in a par-
ticular category in the civilian mind. A Code “reflects the vision that a
society has of itself, and of what it wants to be. It covers the life of
every citizen, from birth to death. It is the loom on which the social
fabric is woven”.99 It is more than a mere law; it affects the legal iden-
tity of the province. The Code is a symbol,100 it represents Quebec’s
droit commun or jus commune.101 It has been described as an œuvre
de commandement and a social contract: “the legislator intended that
the Civil Code of Québec should reflect the social contract of our lib-
eral, democratic society”.102 The Code is more than normative and as
Sylvio Normand has suggested, “the Civil Code is one of those legisla-
tive texts whose importance surpasses the particular norms that it
contains. It holds a symbolic charge that, although weakened, contin-
ues to characterize the law of Quebec”.103 Yet, an important part of
what family life is now – de facto union – is out of family law in the
Code. The absence of regulation of de facto spouses in the Book of the
Code entitled “The Family” sends Quebecers a message that is much
more complex than the respect of so-called choice, autonomy and lib-
erty.104 The Civil Code “really has the spirit of a constitution, because
it embodies the ideas around which society is constituted”.105 When
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the decision is made to leave someone out of the constitution and the
social contract, it is doubtful whether or not one can pretend that it is
their choice. The economic penalties de facto unions face because of
incoherence between the Code and other laws, statutes and regula-
tions are indicia of the shift in the other normative order affecting
this type of conjugality. These unions were once left out because of
moral imperatives; they are now left out through a double standard
about who needs to be an active agent and who does not.
There are several differences in the legal treatment between the
two types of conjugality. Besides the fact that marriage creates a
legal status and is efficient (it has fixed starting and ending dates and
it is registered) the major differences between married and unmar-
ried partners today in Book 2 can be seen in five elements: the family
residence (art. 401 C.C.Q.), the family patrimony (art. 415 C.C.Q.),
the compensatory allowance (art. 427 C.C.Q.), the partnership of
acquests (default matrimonial regime, arts. 431ff C.C.Q.) and the
obligation of support (art. 585 C.C.Q.). In addition to this list, there is
no obligation for de facto spouses to contribute the expenses of the
household, as it is the case for de jure spouses (arts. 396 and 521.6
C.C.Q.). These only apply to de jure unions. The Supreme Court of
Canada recently confirmed that this state of affairs was not unconsti-
tutional for the purposes of the Charter.106 Although the Court was
divided in its decision, two points are certain. First, the situation of
de facto spouses is not, in itself, unconstitutional. And second, it is
flawed and it is not the Court’s task to fix it.
Before this landmark decision in Eric v. Lola, thorough qualita-
tive research exposed that only 23% of de facto spouses in the prov-
ince knew that it was impossible to claim spousal support on the
breakdown of the union.107 Put differently, a striking 77% of de facto
spouses did not know their basic rights. The data has not been consid-
ered relevant by the Supreme Court, but only time will tell whether
or not this should have been considered with greater interest.108
APPEARANCES OF CONJUGALITY AND LAWLESS LOVE 183
106. Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., 2013 SCC 5.
107. Belleau, Quand l’amour et l’État, supra note 42 at 76 [footnotes omitted].
108. Whether it was relevant or not might depend solely on the way it has been
pleaded and evidenced. According to Alain Roy, “tout semble s’être ici joué sur
une simple question de preuve. Lola n’a pas produit de preuve sociologique
probante pour appuyer ses prétentions. Certes, des expertises ont été déposées
par ses procureurs [...]. Toutefois, ces expertises sont de nature qualitative
et non pas quantitative. La différence est fondamentale. [...] Que serait-il
advenu si le sondage réalisé en 2008 par la firme Ipsos Descarie à la demande
de la Chambre des notaires avait été admis en preuve? Réalisé auprès de
It would be interesting to see whether the numbers will change in the
next few years. However, twenty years of public-awareness cam-
paigns on this issue, as well as high-profile cases, have made little
progress in raising the general understanding of the state of the
law in Quebec. The current regime creates a confusion in which
Quebecers are led to believe that there is no difference in treatment.
To be clear, the similarities are not bad in and of themselves.
They rely on logic of non-discrimination in the ‘public’ sphere. The
State acknowledges the variety of conjugal models.109 Confusion
derives from the fact that in the vast majority of laws and regulations
that the average Quebecer knows or is faced with, little to no distinc-
tion is drawn between married and unmarried spouses. Both on the
federal and the provincial levels, unmarried spouses generally enjoy
the same status as married spouses. As such, for purposes of income
tax, pension plans, insurance, labour laws and social laws, de facto
spouses will be considered on the same footing as married partners.
In as many as thirty-eight crucial statutes, de facto spouses and mar-
ried partners are considered to be legally equivalent. Yet, “[i]n Que-
bec, given its civilian traditions, rights will generally only arise if the
parties have registered their relationship, though even in that prov-
ince for such federal purposes as income tax, ‘common law spousal
status’ arises after one year’s cohabitation even without registration,
and the courts will recognize contributions to the acquisition of
assets”.110 The result is that the citizen, when faced with the legal
system, will assume that there is no major difference between being
married or not; he or she is almost111 always treated similarly. It is
easy to believe so when you receive mixed signals. Yet, on breakdown
to use a concrete example, he or she will learn the hard way that there
are important differences between de jure and de facto unions.
According to Benoît Moore,
De facto spouses, for the most part, do not understand the real
juridical effects of their situation. The assimilation by “everyday”
law (tax, insurance, pensions) of de facto spouses to married
spouses has created, in the collective conscience, the false im-
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pression that there is a perfect assimilation of these two types of
unions.112
This idea that, in the public opinion, both types of unions are
completely equivalent refers to the phenomenon of automatic mar-
riage (phénomène du mariage automatique). It is a commonly held
social belief that de facto spouses enjoy the same rights as married
partners. For Hélène Belleau in her recent book Quand l’amour et
l’État rendent aveugle, the myth of automatic marriage means that
It became very clear that the majority of individuals interviewed
knew very little, if anything of the rights and obligations sur-
rounding marriage, but many of them thought that de facto
spouses, after several years of living together or after the birth of
a child, benefited from the same juridical framework as married
couples.113
Hélène Belleau’s qualitative empirical studies confirm a vast
majority of persons assert that they perceive no difference at all in
terms of the nature of the relation between these two forms of rela-
tionships.114 While outside of the Code de facto spouses are regulated
through their appearances, in the Code appearances of marriage do
not entail any rights, duties or privileges. The similarities, while not
bad in themselves, are problematic because “[the] undifferentiated
treatment of couples [...] has progressively created a false impression
of the disappearance of the de facto union, and of a lack of differentia-
tion between marriage and de facto unions”.115
In addition to confusing people, the interaction with other
mechanisms of social law is under-evaluated.116 Some similari-
ties rely on false assumptions and have economic consequences for
de facto spouses. Taxation offers a good example where the citizen
could be unpleasantly surprised, even without the breakdown of the
union. The stakeholder may be unaware of the fiscal costs of living in
a de facto union, in particular if his or her spouse does not contribute
to the expenses of the household. The monetary impact, as Stéphanie
Grammond demonstrated, can be enormous, especially on low-
income individuals. Her example goes as follow: for a mother of two
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earning $35,000 a year, becoming a de facto spouse could have a fiscal
cost as high as $9,000 a year depending on the income of her de facto
spouse. If the mother of two had a low income – i.e. $20,000 or less a
year – the fiscal cost could amount to $15,000.117 This retribution of
wealth regime is great, but relies on a possibly wrong assumption.
The regime assumes that the new spouse contributes and has a real
economic implication towards the family as a whole. While we can
hope it is the case, the new de facto spouse has no obligation at all to
do so. The idea of a joint economic venture is an imperative of de jure
unions. It is not for other types of unions. Stéphanie Grammond only
drew a picture of extreme situations where the fiscal cost is high – she
is a journalist after all – but these same economic penalties could be
demonstrated in others contexts.118
Law creates and sustains confusions. A complicated interplay
between the similarities and differences of de jure and de facto unions
feeds the confusion between rights, duties and obligations of de jure
spouses and de facto spouses. Therefore, the freedom of choice argu-
ment is highly problematic. The State has an active role in the confu-
sion. It is unjust to attach important legal effects to misinformed
choice. Of course, there are other views on this issue. For some, de
facto spouses made a choice, which they are free to make.119 They
have individual autonomy and the State should not interfere.120
However, the State does in fact interfere... In a context where the
State maintains confusion with ambiguous laws, can one truly talk of
choice?121
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De jure unions come with various imperative mechanisms
aimed at protecting vulnerable parties when necessary. These mech-
anisms are imposed, they are not chosen. The idea of “choice” for de
facto spouses echoes a discourse that has been completely discarded
for de jure spouses. When issues surrounding marriage started to
emerge in the courts, the law developed so as to even out power imbal-
ances between spouses. Indeed, at a time when people could freely
choose their marriage contracts, courts realized that it was not much
of a choice, and that important power imbalances affected this con-
tract. Courts and the legislature boldly put forward mechanisms to
balance out the economic interests of de jure spouses.122 “[T]he legis-
lative record establishes that the obligatory character of the family
patrimony followed acknowledgement that the freedom of contract in
matrimonial matters had failed”.123 Much is asked of de facto part-
ners, but one must not forget that “[t]he fact that two parties may
wish to avoid the legal consequences of marriage does not mean that
they did intend to exploit each other economically, and even if they
did, there is no reason for the law to countenance such behaviour
between cohabitees when it will not permit it between strangers”.124
The Code does not merely promote freedom of choice and contract:
the Code limits them when it is necessary. This being said, de facto
spouses are deprived of most legal recourses aimed at easing de jure
couples’ separations in civil law, even those not justified by the mar-
riage or civil union contract per se.
Some legal tools are available to de facto unions. They can draft
de facto union contracts. According to a quantitative survey of the
Chambre des notaires, only 19% of people living in de facto unions do
so.125 In Belleau’s qualitative research,126 nobody had such a con-
tract.127 Unjust enrichment is another option.128 In conjugal con-
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texts, it has been compared to a compensatory allowance,129 which is
only one of the elements de facto spouses are deprived of compared to
de jure spouses. Conceptually, unjust enrichment is an exceptional
recourse that has been described as available for the “marginaux du
droit”.130 While used today, “courts have historically expressed hesi-
tancy at deploying general private law to remedy economic fallout of
de facto unions”.131 The contract of undeclared partnership is another
possibility.132 Scholars have expressed the difficulties associated
with the action pro socio in intimate contexts.133 It is debatable
whether the legal costs associated with these proceedings are worth
their potential benefits. Whether de facto spouses are willing to dis-
cuss about contracts foreseeing the end of love is also far from certain.
The difference between de facto and de jure couples remains
unclear to this day.134 If freedom of choice is that important, maybe it
should not apply only to certain kinds of conjugality. While de facto
unions were once stigmatized in Quebec civil law for imperatives of
moral responsibility, it appears that they are now left behind for
imperatives related to choice and penalized through various eco-
nomic sanctions (e.g. fiscal cost, no support obligation, no property
separation mechanism, and more). De facto spouses should not be the
only ones to be responsible for their intimate ‘choices’. Issues sur-
rounding de facto unions might only be a symptom of the real problem
of the regulation of adult intimate relationships: the legal framework
attached to marriage.135 Family law has various functions. When citi-
zens withdraw – for whatever reasons (religious, social, ideological,
legal) – of the legal system and yet still claim its benefits or advan-
tages, it suggests that law’s task is not fulfilled.
188 LES APPARENCES EN DROIT CIVIL
no 9 (La référence, January 2013); Robert Leckey, “Unjust Enrichment and De
Facto Spouses” (2012) 114 R. du N. 475 [Leckey, “Unjust Enrichment”].
129. Leckey, “Unjust Enrichment”, supra note 128 at 487.
130. Didier Lluelles and Benoît Moore, Droit des obligations, 2nd ed. (Montreal:
Thémis, 2012) at 741, citing Philippe Malaurie and Laurent Aynès, Droit civil :
les obligations (Paris: Cujas, 1996) at 543.
131. Leckey, “Unjust Enrichment”, supra note 128 at 477.
132. Leckey, “Unjust Enrichment”, supra note 128 at 499-500 and, generally, Chris-
tine Morin, “La société tacite : quand les affaires se conjuguent avec l’amour”
(2008) 110 R. du N. 825 [Morin, “La société tacite”].
133. Morin, “La société tacite”, supra note 132.
134. The Conseil du statut de la femme defended in an opinion that the situation of de
facto unions in civil law was discriminatory and that the day-to-day life of cou-
ples, whether married or not, was similar. Conseil du statut de la femme, Pour
une véritable protection, supra note 69.
135. The problem with the rules of marriage is far beyond the scope of this article.
However, for a few solutions to the problem of regulating de facto unions, see the
propositions made by Roy, “Affaire Éric c. Lola”, supra note 108 at 296ff.
Conclusion
The title of this chapter could have read Appearance of Conju-
galities and Lawless Love or Appearances of Conjugality and Lawless
Love. While these titles are profoundly intertwined, they neither
refer to the same legal evolution, nor to the same general ideas. The
first version – Appearance of Conjugalities and Lawless Love – refers
to appearance as the mise au jour, as the idea of becoming visible. To a
certain extent, it is about adult intimate relationships emerging as
conceptually possible in the moral and legal spheres. In this context,
conjugality distances itself from a more or less unitary notion, and
becomes plural and multifaceted. These ideas speak to the advent of
multiple patterns for adult intimate relationships both in law and in
life. In the second form – Appearances of Conjugality and Lawless
Love – “appearances” conveys an idea of mimicking, looking like, or to
seem like, something or someone else. Conjugality in such settings is
unitary, and normative: it is that thing that we are trying to emulate
for different reasons. It brings up how various conjugal unions share
the same characteristics and similarly-lived experiences, or how, to
be recognized as such, intimate adult relationships must fit a pat-
tern. This way of sharing intimacy and of being interdependent rep-
resents an ideal that even most formal types of union cannot achieve.
Notwithstanding the different meanings of appearance(s) and conju-
gality(ies), these titles reflect major shifts in adult intimate relation-
ships in the Canadian context. Not unlike a couple, while both titles
would individually be complete, there is something more to it when
they are combined.
The overview of the history of the treatment of de facto unions
offered a fertile ground to point out that the regulation, or absence of
regulation, of conjugal relationships often relies on imperatives other
than law, here religious values and the promotion of neo-liberal val-
ues. Indeed, the importance of morality, especially religious morality,
has been central to family law. As Benoît Moore beautifully summa-
rizes:
Religion used to ensure cohesion and homogeneity. For family
matters, it imposed, directly or indirectly, a unitary conception of
the family based on marriage, a religious sacrament and a civil
institution that was indissoluble. The family stood apart from
individual choice and constituted the central institution of soci-
ety, with the husband as its absolute sovereign. The dissipation
of religious authority, as much by the weakening of its power as
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by the multiplication of faiths, has been a crucial element in the
reorientation of family law. The fundamental values of equality
and individual autonomy have taken over and become the foun-
dations of this family revolution.136
With the fall of religious morality in law, and especially in
family law, another normative order arises. Neoliberal values have
now replaced religion.
Adult intimate relationships in Quebec are, from a legal per-
spective, at the crossroads. What will happen next in terms of public
policy and legal reform will likely influence the future of family law.
The intention was not to propose elements for reform; some sugges-
tions might nonetheless be of interest. In the seventies, Daniel
Dhavernas already emphasized to the C.C.R.O. that it was a mistake
to evaluate and define marriage according to its form (and the statut
it creates), as opposed to its content and fundamental realities.137
In the same context, François Heleine asked “should civil law not be
inspired by the attempts to rid the law of guilt, since it gains nothing
from judging”?138 Following the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision
Eric v. Lola, the provincial government has formed a committee in
Quebec, under the direction of Alain Roy, to report first on whether
the time is right for the reform of family law, and, if so, for the direc-
tion that such reform should take. One can hope that the past finds a
new echo for the Committee. In a short preliminary opinion, answer-
ing the first question in the affirmative, the Committee adopted a
version of Dhavernas’ proposal: interdependency in conjugal matters
lies in the presence of a child.139 While one can be in favour of or
against such a proposition, it at least has the merit of starting a real
conversation about the regulation of adult intimate relationships.
The real conversation will need to be larger than the regulation
of de facto unions. The debate on the nature of marriage continues to
rage on today. In the province of Quebec, the current regime in which
married partners benefit (or suffer, it depends whom you ask) from
public order or mandatory rules, applies only to de jure couples. Basic
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elements, such as the obligation of support, are not available to
de facto unions. The indignation of people in relation to the regulation
of de facto unions may be symptomatic of the inadequacy of the rules
regulating de jure unions. These rules also need to be reviewed.140
Indeed, it is important to be mindful that “marriage [is only] one of
a number of regulatory frameworks – as part of a broader field of
conjugality in which rules, norms and practices of intimacy and inter-
dependence might vary without connoting a hierarchy of relation-
ships at whose apex, inevitably, (bona fide) marriage sits”.141 The
supremacy of marriage might have expired and great attention must
be given to other kinds of adult intimate relationships.
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